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Cooperation among savings and cooperative banks was criticized by the European 
Commission because of potentially  anti-competitive effects. In an industrial economics 
model of banks taking deposits and giving loans we look at regional demarcation as one of 
such cooperative practices. There are two adjacent markets with one savings or cooperative 
bank being focused on each one and one private commercial bank serving both. We find that 
abolishing regional demarcation indeed increases total loan volume. Savings or cooperative 
banks  always improve market performance and do better without regional demarcation 
which shields the private commercial bank from aggressive competition by these banks.  
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Regional demarcation in the banking industry recently gained considerable interest following 
a communication on retail banking issued by the European Commission. In its final report 
the Commission stated its qualms about a lack of effective competition in EU retail banking 
markets and pointed out the traditionally close cooperation within the sectors of savings 
banks and cooperative banks which play an important role in member states like Germany, 
France and Austria (European Commission, 2007). While the Commission acknowledged that 
cooperation can result in economic and consumer benefits as long as the banks involved are 
small and do not jointly possess a significant market share, it indicated that a more serious 
analysis of the competitive effects of cooperation would be appropriate when the combined 
market position of the cooperating banks threatens to limit competition. Already in October 
2006 the Commission had asked the umbrella organization of the savings banks and the 
cooperative banks to explain the legal, organizational and economic foundations of their 
respective sectors in a questionnaire (Scheerer, 2007). 
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1 Introduction 
In its accompanying staff working paper the Commission’s Directorate-General  for 
Competition  pointed out  that the presence of savings and cooperative banks leads to 
relatively low concentration ratios in the German banking industry on the one hand, but may 
damage competition through the regional market sharing and other cooperative 
arrangements among these banks on the other (European Commission, Directorate-General 
for Competition, 2007, pp. 19, 39).  In  the three-pillar structure of Germany’s banking 
industry, the savings banks and cooperative banks in principle refrain from competing 
among each other in their lending business and focus on competition with banks from the 
other two pillars.
3
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cooperative banks claim that this rule contributes to more effective competition, the 
Commission  voiced its concerns,  indicating  that regional demarcation may  in fact lower 
competition intensity. Regional demarcation was explicitly included in the questionnaire 
mentioned above.  
Reactions from parties concerned came immediately (Drost, Köhler, & Scheerer, 2007): 
Whereas the head of Association of German Banks, the head organization of the first pillar 
comprising the private commercial banks, lauded the Commission and its questioning of 
regional demarcation, the heads of the savings banks’ and cooperative banks’ umbrella 
organizations insisted on the pro-competitive effects of the banks they represent. Even the 
European Parliament dealt with the issue. On June 5, 2008, it almost unanimously adopted a 
resolution based on a report by the Italian MPE Pittella, supporting the Commission but also 
regretting its lack of taking “sufficient account of the specificities of the strictly regulated 
banking sector and the importance of culture, habits and languages in consumer choices and 
protection for financial products” (European Parliament, 2008). As for cooperation between 
banks, the European Parliament emphasized the positive role of all banks for the local 
economy and for the endogenous potential of regions. In the cooperative banking sector this 
resolution was interpreted as a total rout for the Commission (Profil, 2008). 
Since summer 2008 the excitement about the Commission’s report has subsided. The 
banking crisis and its dramatic consequences for the real economy completely dominate 
public perception. In fact, savings banks and cooperative banks appear as pillars of stability 
these days, providing liquidity to local and regional economies. Their position has been 
considerably strengthened both economically and politically. This is not the time to criticize 
them or question their conduct. Nevertheless, the basic questions raised by the European 
Commission deserve further attention: Does cooperation among savings banks and 
cooperative banks enhance or restrict effective competition in the banking industry? And, 
more specifically, is regional demarcation in the savings and cooperative banking sectors a 
device that furthers or hinders competition among banks?  
In this paper we focus on the latter question. At first sight, conventional wisdom from 
microeconomics strongly suggests that restricting the intensity of competition by keeping 
competitors out of a market by means of regional demarcation will lead to a deterioration of 
market performance. However, savings banks and cooperative banks are firms with atypical, 
non-standard objective functions. They are obliged to pursue other objectives but profit 
maximization. Once this stylized fact is taken into account, the answer to the question of the 
impact of regional demarcation is open again. Using the industrial economics approach to 
banking (cf. Freixas & Rochet, 2007, chpt. 3) we want to shed some light on the issue. We 
consider two adjacent bank duopolies with one private commercial bank operating in both 
markets and one savings or cooperative bank present in each one separately. We compare 
the initial situation with regional demarcation to the one without in which each of the two 
savings or cooperative banks competes in both markets. Banks optimally choose loan and 
deposit volumes. As in Germany regional demarcation applies mainly to lending activities, 3 
 
we  explicitly present our results only for the banks’ loan business. For the sake of 
completeness we also briefly mention consequences for the deposit markets. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we briefly present the 
related literature. Section 3 contains our model and the derivation of our results. Extensions 
will be examined in section 4. Section 5 sums up.  
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Private commercial banks from the first pillar of the German banking industry tend to argue 
that regional demarcation creates a disadvantage for them. Standard microeconomic 
thinking suggests disadvantages on the industry level at first sight. When, say, a savings bank 
in one region refrains from competing for customers in another region because of the fact 
that there is a savings bank present in this market, the intensity of oligopolistic competition 
in this other market is lower than it could be which results in a welfare loss. And the same 
happens in the home region of the savings bank considered which does not face competition 
from its counterpart located in the other  region.  Furthermore, the principle of regional 
demarcation restricts savings and cooperative banks in their choice of partners in merger 
projects. They cannot pick the most suitable partner, creating the highest efficiency gain 
possible, but are limited to partners from adjacent regions. This is particularly important for 
Germany where during the last decades hundreds of mergers among savings banks and 
among cooperative banks took place. For cooperative banks Lang and Welzel found evidence 
for the potential efficiency gains forgone  in merger projects due to the impossibility to 
choose the best partner (Lang & Welzel, 1999).  
In this paper we will not look at the dynamic consequences of regional demarcation in the 
context of bank mergers. We focus on a given number of banks and examine the 
consequences of the fact that some banks refrain from competing with each other. Regional 
demarcation looks like a (legal) region cartel with the well-known consequences for market 
performance in a standard oligopoly framework. However, in competition theory models of 
workable and effective competition also point to potentially welfare enhancing effects of 
reducing competition among smaller firms when they face a large firm. But given the quite 
remarkable market shares which savings and cooperative banks hold in many regional 
markets, it is not convincing to defend regional demarcation this way. In Germany, for 
example, regional demarcation rules for savings and cooperative banks are not based on § 3 
of the German Act against Restraints of Competition which permits cartels of small and 
medium-sized firms. In our opinion, the non-standard objective functions of both savings 
and cooperative banks constitute a more interesting issue, raising second thoughts whether 
the conventional wisdom from oligopoly theory applies for regional demarcation.  
Somehow related to our problem is the literature on foreign bank entry after a liberalization 
of the banking market. Most articles investigate the entry of a new bank either via 
acquisition of a domestic bank or via greenfield investment and conclude that competition 4 
 
intensity increases, prices decrease and access to financial products improves. Whether this 
has welfare-enhancing effects is by no means clear-cut, because the related decrease in 
banks’ profits may mitigate their incentives to make necessary investments for example in a 
profitable screening technology (cf. for example Lehner & Schnitzer, 2008). Banks in such a 
market entry setting probably differ in their information about customers. For example in 
Dell’Ariccia & Marquez (2004) domestic banks enjoy an informational advantage and thus 
capture their borrowers. Facing an increase in competition,  domestic banks then 
concentrate on their captive sectors where they serve both, good and risky customers, while 
foreign banks engage in sectors with less information asymmetry and serve good customers 
offering smaller interest rates.  
There exist a few papers which deal with regional demarcation and the way savings and 
cooperative banks compete. Hempell (2002) investigated competition in German banking 
empirically and found less competitive behavior for cooperative banks and savings banks 
compared to private commercial banks (excluding the very largest banks). For an explanation 
she pointed to regional demarcation which excludes competition within two of the three 
pillars of the industry (Hempell, 2002, pp. 32-33). Hakenes & Schnabel (2007) confirm the 
proposition that regional demarcation restricts competition. But the authors show that this 
limitation may also have positive effects. Banks with a regional focus are able to establish 
closer relationships with their customers, creating benefits e.g. from customer loyalty, a 
homogeneous mentality, identification with the region and its economy, and so on. All this 
can be used to generate and extract information, especially soft information, from a bank’s 
customers. As such information is crucial for loan supply to small and medium sized firms or 
private customers with little collateral, regionally oriented banks may be able to serve clients 
a  bank  operating nationally would refuse  to serve because of problems of asymmetric 
information.  On balance, the net effect  of regional demarcation  on social  welfare  is 
ambiguous (Hakenes & Schnabel, 2007). 
In a previous article, Hakenes and Schnabel showed that banks focused on a region are able 
to increase social welfare at least of that region, when  they  invest local funds in local 
projects (Hakenes & Schnabel, 2006). The authors argue that such banks can help solve the 
problem of capital drain from poorer to richer regions offering better interest rates for 
depositors.  In accordance with their statutes savings banks  can implicitly  subsidize  local 
loans by not pursuing profit maximization. Analogously,  cooperative banks following the 
principles of cooperative banking grant privileged access to funds and loans for their 
members. This beneficial role of savings and cooperative banks is only viable under the 
condition of credible regional demarcation.  
The ongoing discussion about the reformation of the German savings bank sector reflects 
these issues. Regional demarcation is seen as fostering access to financial services and 
economic growth in all regions, thereby enhancing social welfare. Private commercial banks 
with their focus on profit maximization cannot deliver this result because they concentrate 
on prospering regions.  By partially eliminating competition among banks from different 5 
 
regions  competitive pressure between regions is reduced which helps weaker regions. 
However, the price to be paid is a sub-optimal capital allocation between regions. Savings 
banks are excluded from possibly beneficial capital transactions outside their home regions 
and are restricted in their growth possibilities (Müller, 2005).  
Regional demarcation is a phenomenon which can be found in the savings and cooperative 
banking sectors of  several European  countries.  However, in some places the process of 
privatizing savings banks went hand in hand with the abolition of regional demarcation (for 
example in Italy 1990, Austria 1979, and Spain 1988). Other countries like France maintained 
regional demarcation when their savings banks were converted into cooperative banks (cf. 
Brunner et al., 2004, pp. 39-41, Hakenes & Schnabel, 2006, p. 4). In Italy competition in the 
banking industry increased  following  the abolition of regional restrictions, but banking 
activities  had been  much more limited by Italian  regulation  before  than  they are, for 
example,  by regional demarcation in Germany (cf.  Carletti, Hakenes, & Schnabel, 2005). 
Carletti et al. note that competition could possibly be intensified by abolishing the regional 
demarcation principle in Germany. However, they remain skeptical towards the possibility of 
transfering Italian-style reforms and especially their positive consequences to the German 
banking market because Germany’s initial situation is very different (cf. Carletti, Hakenes, & 
Schnabel, 2005, p. 47 f).  
Brunner et al. find empirical evidence that competition intensity in the German banking 
sector is comparable to the one in Italy or Spain, where regional demarcation was abolished, 
and more intense than in France where it still exists (Brunner, Decressin, Hardy, & Kudela, 
2004, p. 23). The question is whether getting rid of  the  regional  principle  intensifies 
competition  (and which banks suffer or benefit from this change) or whether the pro-
competitive effects are  somehow  compensated.  Following reforms affecting savings  and 
cooperative banks, observers found evidence of higher profitability of banks  (Brunner, 
Decressin, Hardy, & Kudela, 2004, pp. 39-42) and, for Italy, Spain and France, of an increase 
in market power (Engerer & Schrooten, 2004, p. 3) which may be the result of mergers 
following the reforms. 
From the US market we have evidence that some banking products like deposits and small 
business lending are “local in nature” (Hannan & Prager, 2004, p. 1890). As a consequence, 
some banks are operating only in one local area (called “single-market banks”). However, 
multimarket banks operating in several local areas came into existence in recent years, 
especially after deregulation of regional restrictions. Hannan and Prager show theoretically 
and empirically that multimarket banks which offer the same interest rate in all regions on 
average offer a lower payment for deposits than regional banks, inducing these banks to also 
reduce their deposit rates. The authors mention more market power due to their larger 
operation area, less efficiency because of diseconomies of scale or scope, and better access 
to alternative funds as reasons for the lower interest on deposits offered by multimarket 
banks. Transferred to our context this indicates that banks with a regional focus improve 6 
 
their customers’ economic situation compared to banks with nationwide operations. This 
supplements our findings. 
Another critical point of integration is analyzed by Gehrig  who  shows that opening the 
banking market to foreign competitors involves  also  costs  (Gehrig, 1998).  Although 
integration may intensify competition and thereby reduce banks’ oligopoly rents, it may also 
reduce banks’ incentives to screen their borrowers’ projects which leads to more risky loan 
portfolios. Then, necessary risk premia may even outweigh a decline in loan rates due to 
fierce competition. In this case a foreclosure of regional competition - for example through 
maintaining regional demarcation - is beneficial. Gehrig identifies especially members of the 
European Union as candidates for such costs of integration.  
Having reviewed the literature, we now turn to our research question. In a standard 
oligopoly framework we want to shed some light on the impact of regional demarcation on 
competition in banking. We are interested in  the  pro-  or anti-competitive effects of 
preventing savings banks from competing with savings banks and cooperative banks from 
competing with cooperative banks. Specific attention is paid to the fact that savings and 
cooperative banks pursue other objectives than private commercial banks. We focus on the 
market structure effects and their consequences and consciously leave out informational 
aspects which can add to the effects we identify. 
3 MODEL 
3.1 BASIC SETUP 
Consider two regional banking markets,  1,2 i = , adjacent to each other. There are a number 
0 n  of (large) private  commercial  banks operating in both markets simultaneously. In 
addition, there are  si n  savings banks and  ci n  cooperative banks in each market i. According 
to the logic of regional demarcation,  si n  and  ci n  can take only the values of 0 and 1, i.e., 
there can be no more than one savings  bank  and one cooperative bank in a market. 
Furthermore,  the regional principle requires a savings bank and a cooperative bank in 
market i to serve loan demand only from this market. Customers from the other market  j , 
{1, 2} j∈ , ji ≠ , showing up at the bank will not be served. 
To focus on the most basic setup, assume  0 1 n = , 1 ci n =  and  0 si n = , i.e., we consider one 
private  commercial  bank operating in both  markets, called bank 0,  and one savings or 
cooperative bank  in each market, called bank  (1) c  in market 1 and  (2) c  in market 2, 
operating only in its home market. In total we have two adjacent duopolies with bank 0 
competing in both markets: 7 
 
Market 1 Market 2
Bank 0 
Bank c(1) Bank c(2)
 
FIGURE 1: BANKING MARKETS UNDER REGIONAL DEMARCATION 
The fact that in Figure 1 we represent bank 0 in market i smaller than bank  () ci reflects the 
empirical observation that savings banks and cooperative banks in regional markets quite 
often have similar or even larger market shares than private commercial banks which 
operate in many regions simultaneously. For this reason we do not model bank 0 in market i 
as a large or dominant bank. 
Whenever there is no need to explicitly distinguish between the two savings or cooperative 
banks, as is the case when we look at only one market under regional demarcation, we 
simplify our notation and use the symbol c instead of  (1) c  or  (2) c .  Let  { } 0, ∈ kc  then 
denote the two banks present in a market.  
We use the intermediation approach from the industrial economics of banking (cf. Sealey & 
Lindley, 1977) which dominates both theoretical and empirical analyses and consider banks 
as firms receiving deposits and giving loans. Total loan volume in market i is 
0 = +
c
iii LLL , 
i.e., it consists of the loans 
0
i L  originated by bank 0 and those loans 
c
i L  granted by bank c to 
customers of market i. Each bank charges its borrowers an interest rate 
k
L r . For simplicity 
we assume that loans do not bear any project risk and therefore banks do not have to care 
about creditworthiness of their customers. In fact, a change in competition due to the 
abolition of regional demarcation influences a bank’s loan portfolio  and the related risk 
situation  (cf.  Gehrig, 1998).  Depending on the ability of different bank  types  to extract 
information about their risky customers this may hurt banks differently. It is not obvious if 
regional acting savings and cooperative banks are able to realize informational advantages 
or if they suffer more from an increase in risk than their commercial competitors. We further 
discuss this point in our conclusion. 
In the deposit business we have in market i 
0 = +
c
iii DDD . The corresponding interest rate 
each bank has to pay to its depositors is denoted by 
k
D r . Omitting bank- and markets-specific 
subscripts and superscripts, a bank’s profit function is  
  (, ) =−+− LD r L r D rM C L D π ,  (1) 8 
 
where M  is the bank’s (positive or negative) position in the interbank market, earning or 
paying an exogenously given  market interest rate r ,  and  (, ) CLD is  the  cost function, 
capturing the operational costs of the bank. We assume the usual properties of positive first 
derivatives and of  second derivatives  to ensure existence of solutions to the banks’ 
maximization problems. As for the cross derivatives we make no specific assumption, but 
note via these cross derivatives our cost function may include a (sufficient) condition for 
economies  or diseconomies of scope  between the bank’s loan business and its deposit 
business. Since we are not interested in regulatory issues of the Basel 1 and Basel 2 type, we 
can neglect the bank’s equity without loss of generality. Loans are financed with funds from 
deposits and perhaps the interbank market. The bank’s stylized balance sheet is then given 
by 
  = ++ D DLM α ,  (2) 
where  D α  is the contribution to deposit insurance and the minimum reserve paid to the 
central bank. Substituting this budget condition  (2)  into  (1)  yields the simplified profit 
function 
  ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( , ) =− + −− − LD r rL r r D CLD πα .  (3) 
Interest margins in the loan business and the deposit business, loan and deposit volumes, 
and operational costs determine a bank’s profit.  
Since we analyze oligopolistic markets, the choice of decision variables – prices, i.e., interest 
rates, or quantities, i.e., loan and deposit volumes – matters for our results. Practitioners in 
the banking industry would probably claim that they set interest rates for loans and deposits 
in order to maximize their objective functions.  However, we follow the majority in the 
industrial economics literature on banking and use quantities as decision variables. The well-
known reasoning by Kreps and Scheinkman  that capacity choice followed by price 
competition is logically equivalent to quantity competition further motivates this procedure 
(Kreps & Scheinkman, 1983). In the case of banks we should note that capacity choice not 
only includes building or renting office space and hiring and training staff, but also collecting 
a certain amount of equity capital. Once equity is given, it constitutes a capacity limit in the 
loan business under Basel-type banking regulation. Kirstein and Schliephage have shown 
only recently that if  equity  restricts  lending  activities  this  induces banks to reduce the 
intensity of price competition. They obtain Cournot equilibria as long as raising equity is 
sufficiently costly (cf. Kirstein & Schliephage, 2009). We therefore feel vindicated in our view 
that it makes sense to assume that banks choose their optimal loan and deposit volumes in 
order to maximize their objective functions. 
Turning to objective functions, let us first state that private commercial banks can safely be 
assumed to be interested in profit maximization only, using the profit function defined in (3). 
However, the banks belonging to the other pillars of the banking system which we label by c 9 
 
or  () ci in our model pursue other objectives than pure profit maximization. Savings banks 
are obliged to improve social welfare, for example by providing access to affordable loans 
and deposits. Cooperative banks have to improve the economic situation of their members. 
In its staff working paper the Commission acknowledged this specific role of savings and 
cooperative banks: “Large shares of retail banking activity in Member States such as Austria, 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain are undertaken by cooperative banks and savings banks. 
Many of these banks have social objectives, including widening access to finance for 
consumers and SMEs, which are likely to create a different set of profit incentives to 
shareholder-owned private banks” (European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Competition, 2007, p. 24). 
There exist different ways to model non-profit objectives. Examples can be found in the 
literature on mixed oligopolies which analyzes competition between profit maximizing and 
non-profit  maximizing (public) firms  (Merrill & Schneider, 1966,  Rees, 1984,  Cremer, 
Marchand, & Thisse, 1989,  De Fraja & Delbono, 1989).  Often  such non-profit  firms are 
modeled  as focusing on  social welfare consisting of consumer and producer surplus (cf. 
Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007, pp. 265-266) or as taking at least consumer surplus into account (cf. 
Welzel, 1996). In the area of banking Smith considers a credit union which maximizes service 
to its members subject to a zero-profit constraint, where service is measured by the interest 
rate spread credit union members gain by banking at the credit union instead of going to a 
private commercial bank (Smith, 1984). Barros and Modesto model a public bank maximizing 
apart from operating earnings its volume of loans and deposits, valued at their opportunity 
costs (Barros & Modesto, 1999). Pursuing this objective function will increase the supply of 
loans and the demand for deposits. The same holds true for an approach suggested by 
Neumann and coauthors (Neumann & Reichel, 2006; Neumann, Reichel, & Weigand, 2008). 
They assume that non-profit banks determine their output such that their operating 
earnings equal zero.  
The view that savings and cooperative banks produce higher loan and deposit volumes than 
private commercial banks is in line with Lakdawalla and Philipson’s theory of nonprofit firms 
which they treat as firms willing to forego profits in exchange for higher output (Lakdawalla 
& Philipson, 2006). We therefore model these banks as considering their earnings on the one 
hand and output levels on the other. Since our prime interest is  in the joint effects  of 
regional demarcation and the existence of banks (also) pursuing non-profit objectives, we do 
not care about the detailed differences between a savings bank and a cooperative bank. In 
fact, we treat them as identical. 
This leads us to modify the approach of Barros and Modesto (1999) and assume that those 
banks labeled by c and  () ci which could be either savings or cooperative banks recognize in 
their objective functions the volume  of loans and of  deposits, weighted with their 
opportunity costs. Omitting bank- and markets-specific subscripts and superscripts the profit 
function savings banks and cooperative banks maximize is  10 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) 1 ( , ) L D LD r r L r r D rL r D C L D π α θθ α =− + −− + + − − .   (4) 
We suggest that in our context, the parameters  L θ  and  D θ  can be interpreted as the 
additional value a savings or cooperative bank realizes when attending to its social duty and 
providing access to loans and deposits.
 4
c
 To simplify the terminology we from now on speak 
of a cooperative bank when addressing a bank   or  () ci. 
3.2 EQUILIBRIUM UNDER REGIONAL DEMARCATION 
In this first step we analyze the two markets separately. The private commercial bank 0 is 
operating in both markets, while the  activities of banks  () ci and  () cj are restricted by 
regional demarcation to either market i or market  j . In each market competition is then 
characterized by a mixed duopoly. We assume that both cooperative banks are identical and 
restrict our analysis to market i. 
Inverse demand functions for loans and inverse supply functions for deposits in market i are 
given by 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 () ( ) () ( ) 0
0 0 () ( ) () ( ) 0
ci c j c ci c j
L i ii L ii i ii
ci c j c ci c j
D i ii D ii i ii
r a L b LL r a LL b L
re D f DD re DD f D
= −− + = − + −
= ++ + = + + +
and
and
  (5) 
with  [ ] , 0;1 bf ∈  representing the degree of product differentiation. If  ,1 bf= ,  loans or 
deposits offered by a private  commercial bank do not differ from those offered by a 
cooperative bank. With  ,1 bf< , customers value banking products differently, depending 
on whether they are sold by bank 0 or by bank  () ci. Differences in customer valuation can 
arise e.g. from customer proximity, emotional attachment or loyalty to one bank type or 
another, or a different level of service and advice surrounding the product.  Note that 
customers do not distinguish between products offered by the cooperative banks. This is a 
simplifying assumption reflecting the fact that customers primarily value the cooperative 
idea. If customers had a personal relationship to “their” cooperative bank, one would have 
to introduce different weights for different banks even within the cooperative sector. For 
later use we include loan and deposit volumes of the cooperative bank  () cj in market i in 
(5). At this stage the regional demarcation principle implies that these values have to be set 
equal to zero in the decision problems. Later, when we look at the equilibrium without 
regional demarcation, this restriction will be dropped.  
Bank 0’s maximization problem is 
                                                      
4 In Barros and Modesto (1999), the parameters  L θ  and  D θ  represent weights for the 
revenues from loans and deposits which are chosen by government for regulatory reasons. 11 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0 00
,
0 0 0 0 00 0 0
( ) () ( ) ()
m a x () ( 1 )()
() ( 1 )() ,, ,
s.t. 0, 0
Li i Di i LD
Lj j Dj j i j i j
c j ci c j ci
ij i j
r rL r r D




= − + −−
+ − + −− −
= = = = .
  (6) 
The private commercial bank maximizes its combined profit from both markets served. The 
constraints represent the principle of regional demarcation. Using (4)  we get for the 
cooperative bank in market i   
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )




() () () () () () () ()
( ) () ( ) ()
max ( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) , , ,
s.t. 0, 0
ci c ci c ci
Li i Di i LD
c ci c ci
Lj j Dj j
ci ci ci ci ci ci ci ci
Li j D i j i j i j
c j ci c j ci
ij i j
r rL r r D
r rL r r D





= − + −−
+ − + −−
+ ++− + −
= = = = ,
  (7) 
where again the constraints ensure that the regional principle holds. Note that we use the 
same cost function  () C ⋅ in (6) and (7). This reflects the stylized fact that cooperative banks 
(and savings banks) despite being small compared to private commercial banks cooperate in 
their network and are thus able to produce with the same technology as a large bank. 
However, this assumption is not crucial for our results. 
Maximization  with respect to loan volume and solving the first-order condition leads to 
reaction functions in market i 









L L a r bL
L
 ∂
= −− −  ∂ 
  (8) 
for the private commercial bank and 






i i iL ci
i
C




= −− − +  ∂ 
  (9) 
for the cooperative bank, where 
k
i CL ∂∂ are the marginal operational costs for loans of bank 
k . Note the last term in (9): The higher the output orientation in the cooperative bank’s loan 
business, i.e., the higher  L θ , the higher will be its loan volume for a given loan volume of the 
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FIGURE 2: BEST-RESPONSE FUNCTIONS IN A LOAN MARKET WITH REGIONAL DEMARCATION 
In fact, bank c’s interest in output in addition to profit works like a commitment to more 
aggressive behavior in the loan market, implying a rightward shift of the cooperative bank’s 
reaction curve. Figure  2  depicts this effect for constant marginal costs and  1 b = . For a 
0 L θ >  bank  () ci sells more loans and bank 0 sells less. 
Solving the best-response functions (8) and (9) for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in loan 
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from which we can calculate the equilibrium interest rates charged as 
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  (11) 
If  0 b = , customers perceive loans of the two banks as completely different, non-
substitutable products, and both banks produce their monopoly loan volume. Note, 
however, that even then the cooperative bank will have a loan volume  2 Lr θ  above the 
private commercial bank’s loan volume for the benchmark case of identical marginal costs of 
lending, and it will charge, by the same token, a lower interest rate. For the case of loans 
being perceived as homogeneous ( 1 b = ), bank c’s loan volume will be higher by  Lr θ .  13 
 
In general we find that the loan volume 
() ci
i L  sold by the cooperative bank under regional 
demarcation is above the volume 
0
i L  of the private commercial bank, if and only if  









,  (12) 
i.e., as long as the difference between the cooperative bank’s marginal operational costs in 
the loan business and its marginal valuation of its non-profit objective is smaller than the 
marginal costs of the private commercial bank. The fact that it values loan quantity per se 
makes the cooperative bank more aggressive in the loan market and implies a shift of best-
response functions and market shares as indicated in Figure 2. Condition (12) can hold even 
if the cooperative bank has a cost disadvantage. Its commitment to the non-profit objective 
offsets a competitive advantage of the private commercial bank. Our solution is in line with 
that of Neumann and Reichel, although they assume that marginal costs of a cooperative or 
savings bank exceed those of the private commercial bank, if commercial banks are to stay in 
the market (cf. Neumann & Reichel, 2006, pp. 255-256).  
In our model economies of scale and scope are clearly an issue to be discussed. The marginal 
operational costs of loans were assumed neither to be constant nor to be identical. For bank 
0 they depend also on the level of business in market ji ≠ . Economies of scale could in 
principle lead to a cost advantage of bank 0 which operates in both markets, and to a 
violation of (12). Furthermore, a higher total deposit volume from both markets could lower 




 Whether or not cooperative or savings banks have higher marginal costs 
than private commercial banks is, in the end, an empirical question. Cost disadvantages of 
these non-profit banks could arise from their smaller size or the greater density of their 
branch networks. However, there are also factors which can compensate such disadvantages 
or even lead to cost advantages. As mentioned above, both in the savings and the 
cooperative banking sectors there is large-scale cooperation between banks and via their 
umbrella organizations, leading effectively to the realization of economies of scale. We 
should also be aware of the fact that savings and cooperative banks with their regional focus 
enjoy an informational advantage over private commercial banks, leading to lower lending 
costs. As for economies of scope, we find it hard to believe that the difference in deposit 
volumes between bank 0 and bank   can lead to a significant cost advantage of bank 0 in 
the loan business. Taken together, condition (12) seems to be in good shape. Under normal 
circumstances we can expect it to hold. 
Turning briefly to the interest rates borrowers pay for their loans we find that if (12) holds, 
the loan rate at the cooperative or savings bank  () ci is lower than the rate at the private 
commercial bank as long as loans are considered as differentiated products ( 1 b < ). Quite 
                                                      
5 A negative cross-derivative between loans and deposits in bank 0’s cost function would be 
sufficient for economies of scope. 14 
 
naturally, for  1 b = , i.e., the case of homogeneous products, interest rates for loans are 
identical at both banks.  
An analogous analysis can be performed for competition in the deposit market. We arrive at 
similar conclusions: Cooperative and savings banks in equilibrium have a higher volume of 
deposits in a market compared to a private commercial bank, if and only if 









  (13) 
holds.  Again the commitment to output reflected in the objective function could even 
compensate a cost disadvantage of bank  () ci .  If customers perceive deposits as 
differentiated products ( 1 f < ), (13) implies that the private commercial bank pays a lower 
interest on deposits than the cooperative bank. For homogeneous deposits ( 1 f = ) interest 
rates are the same. Hannan and Prager got similar results in their analysis of single-market 
and multi-market banks in the US, finding that banks offering their products in several 
markets grant lower deposit rates than banks operating only locally (Hannan & Prager, 2004, 
p. 1891). 
3.3 EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT REGIONAL DEMARCATION 
Having analyzed the two banking markets under regional demarcation, we now move on to a 
different framework where both the commercial bank 0 and the two cooperative banks  (1) c  
and  (2) c  are allowed to offer their products in both markets. There is no longer regional 
demarcation preventing bank  () cj from competing in market  i .  Instead, we have the 
situation depicted in Figure 3. 
 





FIGURE 3: BANKING MARKETS WITHOUT REGIONAL DEMARCATION 
We first need to aggregate loan demand and deposit supply of the two adjacent markets. 
Demand and supply conditions (5) are now replaced by  15 
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Customers perceive products of the two cooperative banks  () ci  and  () cj as perfect 
substitutes, i.e., there is only product differentiation between the private commercial bank 
and the two cooperative banks. Arbitrage prevents the banks to price discriminate between 
the two markets.  
Using (14) to describe demand and supply conditions and dropping the constraint of regional 
demarcation, the private commercial bank’s profit maximization problem implies now for its 
loan business in both markets 
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For cooperative bank  () ci we get 
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and analogously for bank  () cj. Solving for the equilibrium in the aggregate loan market with 
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  (17) 
Since we modeled the two cooperative banks  () ci and  () cj symmetrically, 
() ci L  will equal 
() cj L  in equilibrium leading to  
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From (17) and (14) the equilibrium interest rates 
0
L r  and 
c
L r  can be calculated.  
As before, we are interested in the cooperative banks’ share of the market in relation to the 
private commercial bank’s share. It turns out that the two cooperative banks jointly offer a 
greater loan volume, i.e., 
() ( ) 0 c ci c j LL L L =+> , if and only if 16 
 








.  (19) 
This is basically the same condition as (12)  which had been derived under regional 
demarcation. One might suspect that the cooperative bank’s marginal costs on the left-hand 
side are now lower (making the condition even more likely to hold), if there exist economies 
of scale, because this bank now offers its services in both markets. And if a larger market 
simplifies the attraction of deposits, economies of scope may further diminish the 
cooperative bank’s marginal loan costs. However, we should be aware of the fact that a 
cooperative bank not only enjoys a larger market, but also faces more intensified 
competition due to the presence of the other cooperative bank in its home market.  
As for equilibrium interest rates, we again find that cooperative banks charge a loan rate 
0 c
LL rr <  as long as (19) holds and loans are perceived as differentiated ( 1 b < ). When we look 
at deposits, aggregating deposit supply functions, using arbitrage conditions and solving the 
maximization problems leads us to an equilibrium in the deposit market, where the two 
cooperative banks jointly collect more deposits than the private commercial bank, if and 
only if 








  ,  (20) 
and pay a higher interest on deposit as long as deposits are differentiated ( 1 f < ). 
3.4 COMPARISON OF THE ANALYSIS WITH AND WITHOUT REGIONAL DEMARCATION 
We are now in a position to compare the equilibrium under regional demarcation to the one 
without regional demarcation. Recall that we would like to know whether regional 
demarcation reduces the intensity of competition as the European  Commission had 
suspected. We therefore focus on loan volumes and profit levels. Let 
k
reg L  denote bank k ’s 
total loan volume from one or, if relevant, both markets in the equilibrium under regional 
demarcation and let 
k
nreg L  denote total loan volume without regional demarcation. 
Comparing equilibrium values for a cooperative bank  () ci, we find that the bank hands out 
less loans under regional demarcation, i.e., 
() () () ci ci ci
reg i nreg LLL = <, if 
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  (21) 
2 3 b −  is positive and less than 
2 4 b − . Condition (21) then hinges on the signs and relative 
magnitudes of the two terms in squared brackets. Both squared brackets are strictly positive, 
if the cooperative bank sells a strictly positive loan volume both under regional demarcation 17 
 
and without regional demarcation. Note that the change in marginal costs between the two 
regimes matters, since for both bank  () ci and bank 0 on the left-hand side we find the 
marginal costs related to the loan volume sold in market i only, whereas on the right-hand 
side the marginal costs relate to the total loan volume sold by a bank in both markets. To fix 
ideas on a benchmark, let us assume that the marginal costs of lending for bank  () ci remain 
unchanged, i.e., 
() () ci ci
i CL CL ∂∂ = ∂∂ . For the private commercial bank 0 the analogous 
assumption 
00
i CL CL ∂∂= ∂∂  is quite natural, given that this bank serves both markets 
under both regimes and in a realistic scenario will also be present in a large number of other 
local markets. Under these assumptions the two squared brackets are identical, and we 
conclude that the cooperative bank will have a higher loan volume without regional 
demarcation compared to the regime under regional demarcation. 
We still need to develop an intuitive understanding of what will happen, if marginal costs are 
not identical across regimes. Earlier we argued that cooperative and savings banks with the 
help of their networks and umbrella organizations already today realize economies of scale. 
However, if bank  () ci in the regime without regional demarcation offers loans in the 
adjacent market  j , it might suffer from informational disadvantages and customers who still 
need to be convinced to come to bank  () ci. This could amount to an increase in the 
marginal costs of lending, implying 
() () ci ci
i CL CL ∂∂ < ∂∂ . As long as this increase is not too 
strong, it will not alter our result. If, on the other hand, serving a second market leads to a 
decrease in the marginal costs of loans at the cooperative bank, our result is strengthened.  
Knowing that each cooperative bank extends its loan supply when the regional demarcation 
principle is abolished, we now look at bank 0. The private commercial bank will sell a higher 
loan volume under regional demarcation, i.e., 
00
reg nreg LL > , if in the benchmark case of 
identical marginal costs across regimes considered before 
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.  (22) 
The term in the first bracket is nothing else but two times bank  () ci’s monopoly output in 
market i. By the same token the second bracket equals twice bank 0’s monopoly profit in 
that market. If the marginal costs of both banks were identical, bank  () ci would sell a higher 
monopoly output than bank 0 as long as it pursues a non-profit objective ( 0 L θ > ) and (22) 
would hold. A cost disadvantage of the cooperative bank weakens this result, whereas 
stronger non-profit orientation and less differentiation strengthen it. If loans are perfectly 
differentiated ( 0 b = ), bank 0 sells the same loan volume under both regimes. 
Finally, we are interested in  the total loan volume in both markets without regional 
demarcation compared to a situation with regional demarcation. We know already that 
cooperative banks will increase loan volumes and the private commercial bank will decrease 18 
 
its loan volume once regional demarcation is abolished. Again we assume identical marginal 
costs across regimes. The expansionary effect at non-profit banks dominates the 
contractionary effect at the private commercial bank, i.e.,  nreg reg LL > , if   
  ( ) ( )( ) () 0 22 2 20 L ci
CC
b bar b r
LL
θ
∂∂  − − −− + + >  ∂∂ 
.  (23) 
The term in squared brackets is the loan volume a cooperative bank sells in the two markets, 
if there is no regional demarcation. I.e., as long as abolishing regional demarcation does not 
push the non-profit banks out of the loan markets (which we do not expect given that they 
increase their loan business once demarcation is abolished), total loan volume will be higher 
without demarcation.  
As for profit levels, similar comparisons show that the private commercial bank’s profits 
from its loan business will decrease under plausible conditions once regional demarcation is 
abolished.  When we look at cooperative banks and evaluate their objective functions 
(inclusive of the non-profit objective as introduced in (4)), we find that the non-profit banks 
will benefit, if there is no longer regional demarcation, as long as loan products are 
sufficiently homogeneous.  
To sum up, abolishing the regional demarcation principle leads to an improved supply of 
loans  and to lower interest rates for loans. This conclusion supports the European 
Commission’s qualm about regional demarcation and the proposition that the (self-) 
restriction to regional markets limits competition and therefore loan supply. Bank customers 
would be better off without this limiting constraint. But in stark contrast to the claim of 
some  private  commercial banks  and their lobbyists, this distortion is not beneficial to 
cooperative or savings banks but favorable for private commercial banks which face less 
competition. A tradition or regulation which protects savings banks from savings banks and 
cooperative banks from cooperative banks effectively shields private commercial banks from 
intensified competition. 
4 EXTENSIONS 
In this section we want to shed some light on the role the parameters  L θ  and  D θ  play. Recall 
that these two parameters are the distinctive characteristics of bank  () ci’s objective 
function. In a first step we compare the situation analyzed before to a world where all banks 
are private commercial banks. With this comparison we want to show which adjustments 
are due to market integration when regional demarcation is abolished and which of them 
refer to the existence of non-profit banks. This will clarify the influence  L θ  and  D θ  have on 
the results. Then we introduce different parameters for the different submarkets to reflect 
the fact that a cooperative bank may treat loyal customers in its home market differently 
compared to new customers in the adjacent market. 19 
 
To investigate competition only between profit maximizing banks, assume that  L θ  and  D θ  
equal zero. We call this situation pure competition while a market where commercial and 
cooperative banks compete is called mixed. The pure situation with regional demarcation is 
already depicted in figure 2: in a symmetric equilibrium both commercial banks offer the 
same amount of loans and deposits if marginal costs are identical. The quantities are smaller 
than the amounts a non-profit bank would offer. In detail private commercial bank 01 offers 
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This amount is smaller than the amount of loans offered in a mixed market, as long as 
condition (12) holds. The existence of a non-profit competitor, i.e., a strictly positive value of 
L θ , then improves the credit supply in separated markets.  Condition  (13) suggests an 
analogous conclusion for total deposit supply. 
In order to identify the effect the integration of markets has on loan and deposit quantities 
we next consider an aggregated market where 3 private commercial banks compete. Then 
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Again the three banks serve the market equally if marginal costs are equal. In this case the 
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which is less than a mixed oligopoly would offer if the following condition holds:  
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The term in the first squared brackets is the monopoly output of a cooperative bank, 
whereas the second one displays the monopoly output of a private commercial bank. As 
mentioned above, we would expect a non-profit bank to offer more, if  L θ  is positive and 20 
 
therefore (28) to hold. This shows again that credit supply is better in a mixed (integrated) 
market and  L θ  improves market outcomes. 
Comparing the situations with and without regional demarcation under pure competition 
shows that the integration of the adjacent markets leads to a reduction of the loan amount 
of a single bank due to more intense competition. At the same time the total loan supply in 
the aggregated market increases due to the additional competitor. This is a standard result 
from oligopoly theory. In the analysis of mixed markets the outcomes for the commercial 
bank turn out to be quite similar. When regional demarcation is abolished, the credit supply 
of the commercial bank decreases while the total loan supply increases. But here the loan 
quantity  the cooperatives offer increases  when markets get integrated. Therefore the 
commercial’s loan quantity has to further decrease in order to attain the same increase in 
total credit supply. This result strengthens the finding that a private commercial bank is 
shielded from fierce competition by the existence of regional demarcation. 
So far each non-profit bank had the same weights  L θ  and  D θ  for loans and deposits in its 
objective function, no matter whether it operated in one or two markets. However, when a 
non-profit bank enters a new market it is not engrained in this region  and emotionally 
related to the new customers living there. This suggests lower values of  L θ  and  D θ  in the 
adjacent region which becomes accessible once regional demarcation is lifted. If the non-
profit bank acts like a commercial bank in its non-domestic market, then  L θ  and  D θ  with 
respect to  this market equal zero. Because of this different treatment of markets we 
introduce market specific evaluations. We denote the additional marginal value attached in 
a bank’s objective function to loans and deposits with customers of the home market by 
H
L θ  
and 
H
D θ , and those related to customers in the adjacent market by 
F
L θ  and 
F
D θ . As long as 
regional demarcation exists, these new parameters make no difference because non-profit 
banks are active only in their home  markets, i.e., only 
H
L θ  and 
H
D θ  are relevant.  When 
markets are integrated, each cooperative bank deals with customers from its home market 
and acquires new customers from the adjacent market. A cooperative bank allocates its 
activities between its traditional home market and the newly accessible market according to 
the marginal valuations in its objective function. Calculations show that a cooperative bank 
offers the more loans and takes the more deposits in its initial market, the higher are 
H
L θ  
and 
H
D θ .  Similarly, it does more business with customers from the adjacent market, the 
higher are 
F
L θ  and 
F
D θ . The competing banks react with a decrease in quantities on such 
offensive strategies. The cooperative bank from market 2 enters the other  cooperative 
bank’s home market 1 with a loan and deposit quantity decreasing in 
H
L θ  and 
H
D θ . This also 
has a quantity reducing effect for the private commercial bank. Conversely a high 
F
L θ  and 
F
D θ  
decrease the loan and deposit quantities the cooperative bank 1 and the commercial bank 
offer in market 1.  21 
 
In the most realistic and relevant case of  0
HF
LL θθ >> , the cooperative bank already 
established in a market offers more loans to customers in this market than the entering 
cooperative bank from the adjacent market. Similar to the analysis before, the loan quantity 
of the established cooperative bank is greater than the one of the private commercial bank, 
if products are differentiated and the monopoly output of the cooperative bank exceeds that 
of the private commercial bank. Whether the cooperative bank from the adjacent market 
enters the market with a greater loan quantity than the commercial bank depends on the 
magnitude of 
F
L θ  and monopoly outputs. 
If a cooperative bank cares only about customers in its traditional market, 
F
L θ  and 
F
D θ  equal 
zero, and a cooperative bank will act like a commercial bank in the adjacent market once it 
has the opportunity to serve it. In this case,  the cooperative bank offers a higher loan 
amount compared to its competitors in its initial market and becomes the dominant bank in 
this market. Therefore the market-specific valuation has a separating effect and mitigates 
the consequences the abolition of regional demarcation has. 
One more scenario which could be examined is the case of  0 D θ = .  It means that a 
cooperative bank has a non-profit motive only with respect to loans but not with respect to 
deposits. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In a widely noticed report on retail banking the European Commission in 2007 expressed its 
qualms about cooperation in the savings banks and cooperative banks sectors of the 
financial services industries in several member states. From the Commission’s point of view 
this close cooperation may damage effective competition. The report and the ensuing public 
discussion motivated us to analyze in more detail one specific form of cooperation, the 
principle of regional demarcation followed among savings banks and cooperative banks in a 
number of member states. Applying the industrial economics approach to the 
microeconomics of banking we modeled two adjacent markets,  where one private 
commercial bank serves both markets and initially competes in each market with a savings 
or cooperative bank  focusing on this market. We contrasted this setup under regional 
demarcation with an alternative one, where each of the savings or cooperative banks is 
present in both markets, i.e., the private commercial bank faces two competitors in each 
market. Banks were modeled as traditional financial intermediaries, taking deposits and 
giving loans. Since savings and cooperative banks typically by statute or by tradition pursue 
also non-profit objectives, we applied an idea from the theory of non-profit firms and 
captured these banks’ inclination to further social welfare or the economic well-being of 
members by including loan and deposit volumes in their objective functions. This enabled us 
to also find out to what extent our results depend on the non-profit orientation of savings 
and cooperative banks. 22 
 
We first of all point out that the non-profit objective makes a savings or cooperative bank 
more aggressive in quantity competition. This is an insight perfectly in line with many well-
known results from oligopoly theory. As a consequence, savings and cooperative banks 
provide a higher loan volume (at a lower interest rate) and take more deposits (at a higher 
interest rate) than the private commercial bank they compete with. This result holds both 
under regional demarcation and without regional demarcation. The fact that there are banks 
in the loan and deposit markets which pursue a non-profit objective improves  market 
performance and increases effective competition. When we compare the situation without 
regional demarcation to the one with regional demarcation, we find that each savings or 
cooperative bank has a higher loan volume and the private commercial bank has a lower 
loan volume once regional demarcation is abolished. And, probably most important from the 
European Commission’s point of view, total loan volume will be higher without regional 
demarcation. The private commercial bank will suffer a reduction of profits, whereas the 
savings or cooperative banks do better when regional demarcation is eliminated.  These 
results are strengthened when comparing the situation to pure competition of commercial 
banks. 
We therefore conclude that our analysis supports to some extent the European 
Commission’s point: Regional demarcation impairs market performance in banking. 
However, representatives and lobbyists of private commercial banks are mistaken when 
they claim that they suffer the fact that savings banks do not compete with savings banks 
and cooperative banks do not compete with cooperative banks. In fact, private commercial 
banks are shielded by regional demarcation from the aggressive competition of non-profit 
banks. And, no matter whether we have regional demarcation or not, savings and 
cooperative banks improve market performance. 
Without doubt our analysis excluded a number of interesting aspects some of which we will 
address in the future. A first area for further discussion is the specification of the stylized 
non-profit objective function, in particular the weights attached to volumes of loans and 
deposits. We already considered a situation where a savings or cooperative bank pursues its 
non-profit objectives towards customers in its traditional home market more intensively 
than it does towards new customers once regional demarcation is abolished. We find that a 
cooperative bank increases the loan supply for its home customers, the higher the weights 
for its initial home market and the lower the weights for the foreign market. Especially if the 
non-profit objective is adopted only for the home market, this separates markets, even if 
regional demarcation is abolished. Our main findings may be mitigated as the cooperative 
bank from the adjacent market behaves like a private commercial bank. But if weights for 
the home market are substantial, our results persist. We also expect our results to be robust 
against different weights for loans and deposits, e.g., expressing the idea that savings and 
cooperative banks care more about higher loan volumes than about higher deposit volumes. 
In addition, one could wonder about member compensation in case of a cooperative bank or 
about a profit motive of the local or regional authority owning a savings bank as part of the 23 
 
rather complex bundle of objectives of such a bank under German law. Both aspects would 
possibly counteract a bank’s volume orientation. Furthermore, regional demarcation was 
exogenously given in our model. In Germany, for example, it is a voluntarily, strategic choice 
in the cooperative banking sector, and a statutory rule prescribed by the law governing 
savings banks. One could endogenize the decision for or against regional demarcation by 
leaving it to the banks themselves to decide whether or not to operate in an adjacent 
market. Given the wave of mergers the cooperative and savings banking sectors have 
experienced during recent decades, we could also ask how these mergers affect market 
performance in a framework with or without regional demarcation. Another aspect of 
discussion is the choice of decision variables.  Despite our conviction  that  Kreps and 
Scheinkman’s  argument applies here, the special circumstances concerning equity (and 
therefore capacity) in the banking sector make it worthwhile to take a look at price 
competition, too. We are planning to do this in a next step. Finally, in the tradition of the 
industrial economics approach to banking, there was no uncertainty in our model. One may 
wonder how our results will change, if some form of risk is included. The most natural one 
would be credit risk, and existing literature shows that banks then gather information about 
their customers to solve asymmetric information problems. In our case, the regional focus of 
savings and cooperative banks may help them to extract especially soft information about 
their borrowers and therefore improve contracting. Besides, intuition tells us that regional 
demarcation prevents savings and cooperative banks from enjoying more diversified loan 
portfolios (and protects them at the same time from selling loans in markets where they do 
not properly understand the risks). Whereas including uncertainty in industrial economics 
models of banks, e.g. to examine capital regulation or credit derivatives, has become more 
common during the last decade for the cases of perfect competition and monopoly, an 
analysis of two adjacent oligopoly markets under credit risk still poses a considerable 
challenge for future research.   
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